When considering macro-social and technical changes such as these, history can provide insight. Refl ection upon the history of the previous great organizing technology, the automobile, suggests the depth of the current transformation. The 20th century industrial era was characterized as Fordist, after the founder of Ford Motor Company, and the automobile industry was the great organizing industry of its time. Automobile assembly is simultaneously a symbol of, metaphor for and organizing principle of modernity. Whether it was a Ford, GM or Volkswagen ("the peoples' car"), with all of their accompanying industries, these were the icons generating the infrastructure of a new era. The CEO of General Motors was justifi ed in declaring that what was good for GM is good for America and vice versa. Much as Silicon Valley today is the geographic metaphor for a technological transformation and the tourist destination for those wanting to understand the cutting edge of capitalism, Detroit, as the location where the future was being created, drew Antonio Gramsci and Diego Rivera alike.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Silicon Valley was only beginning to be recognized, and the depth of the present transformation was hardly evident. Indeed, one French policy maker remarked that Silicon Valley would return to the sand, and the CFO of a major American fi nancial institution told one of the authors that joining the board of an electronics fi rm was a waste of his time and beneath his dignity.
2 That fi rm was Intel.
Consider, again, the icon of the previous age, the automobile. To exaggerate only slightly, today it is a container for digital value, including semiconductors and software, which control mechanical components, engines, transmissions, brakes, suspensions, steering and now mapping systems. The electronics is the basis now of the emerging possibilities of autonomous vehicles. 3 Software, data and platforms are increasingly signifi cant compo-The rise of digital platforms leads to a number of challenges: Will the rapid introduction of intelligent tools and systems 1 provide real and rising incomes with reasonable levels of equality and growth built on sustained productivity generated by the new technology and strategies? Or will it provoke a world of increasing unemployment and inequality? Will platforms, one of the critical tools/ systems shaping this phase of the digital transformation, deeply disrupt the processes of value creation and capture? Are we doomed, or can we create a new era of growth and abundance? This paper intends to provide an overview of the issues as seen from the West Coast of the United States, but with a viewpoint informed by our years of working in Europe and Asia.
The central organizing technologies for global economy and society have been undergoing a transformation over the last three decades. To illustrate the changes, as late as 2002, the fi ve most valuable fi rms in the world in terms of market value were Microsoft, General Electric, Exxon, Walmart and Pfi zer. In 2017 the most valuable fi rms were Apple, Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Microsoft and Facebook. Moreover, two Chinese platform giants, Alibaba and Tencent, had joined the global top 10. As these platform giants and other platform fi rms expand their footprint, an increasing number of industrial sectors, supply chains and their incumbent fi rms are being reorganized. With these reorganizations, workers in those sectors are being threatened with loss of employment, income and/ or job transformation. Of course, new jobs and opportu-1 We are intentionally steering away from the catch phrase of artifi cial intelligence (AI). While AI and its cousins are tools in the broader category of intelligent tools, they carry connotations, sometimes existential fears, which can divert the debate from the immediate questions and issues. 
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The setting
Let us remind ourselves of a bit of the history, as Silicon Valley and computation are the emblems of the story. The emergence of the digital era really begins with semiconductors. Of course, there were many forces at work during this period in the 1970s, including offshoring, which represented a decomposition and geographic redistribution of economic activity -initially in manufacturing but soon afterwards in services. 11 These other forces were facilitated by early digital communications and data technology that eased coordination of dispersed activities. Cross-national production networks and supply chains developed as a counterpoint to the vertically integrated corporation. As important, not only did many standard components and products begin to be produced in Asia, but multiple competitors entered the market, increasing price competition for many products. In many markets, that meant manufacturing products and tradeable services would quickly become commodities after initial innovation or improvement. Consequently, the principal basis of competition became price.
One strategy for escaping from this particular "commodity trap" involved the conversion of products into a service. Embedded digital electronics, computing capacity, data sources and algorithms can transform a product into a service. For example, devices such as cranes can be embedded in port management systems.
12 A company could sell tires by selling a fl eet management service that would reduce the overall cost of the tires for the fl eet. The list is now endless and refers to "services with everything", or more awkwardly, servitization. 13 The delineation between services and products is becoming ever more diffi cult to determine. For example, is the Amazon Kindle a service or a product?
The point is that the value of a product is increasingly determined by the services it can deliver or facilitate. This servitization has been accelerated by cloud computing. Cloud computing simplifi ed the development and introduction of new digital services. Some of these services, The struggle, really a market battle, to be the "organizer" rather than a commodity, to be distinctive rather than a commodity, is a constant theme of this era. iPhone value, as diverse studies have shown, lies with the control of the operating system and the IP. Firms wishing to supply Apple are forced into commodity nodes in the value chain. Amazon, one might argue, is an enormous marketplace for commodities. However, Amazon is the organizer and the fi rm that captures all the data generated by users of its site.
nents of all manner of machines, affecting everything from GE's jet engines 4 and Pirelli's tires 5 to John Deere's newest tractors. 6 The once pervasive notion of Fordism is a powerful historical referent. But the popular effort to characterize the transformation as post-Fordism, 7 or indeed post-industrialism, simply misses the point of the power and sweep of the digital transformation and the way digital tools such as platforms are seizing hold of social and economic life.
The shifting focus and debate from autos to electronics was captured recently in California by an event meant to initiate a debate about policy for a digital era. A topic of discussion was the possibility of evolving from the now defunct "Treaty of Detroit" -a modus vivendi reached post-World War Two between the Big Three automakers and the United Auto Workers labor union about how profits would be shared between the fi rms and their workers -to a "Treaty of San Francisco", i.e. a set of agreements that presumably would determine the sharing of the benefi ts of the value created by the digital economy with the rest of society.
In this era of inte lligent tools and systems, 8 one of these tools, the digital platform, is emerging as a powerful general organizing principle for the economy. 9 Platforms are a current instrument and accelerator of this ICT transformation of social existence -integrating services and manufacturing, and changing both along the way. 10 The consequences of the advance of computation, the massive adoption of digital platforms and the rise of cloud computing are diverse and deep. We focus here on two: employment and the character of market competition.
